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Abstract—With the rapid development of wireless sensor
networks, smart devices, and traditional information and com-
munication technologies, there is tremendous growth in the use
of Internet of Things (IoT) applications and services in our
everyday life. IoT systems deal with high volumes of data. This
data can be particularly sensitive, as it may include health,
financial, location, and other highly personal information. Fine-
grained security management in IoT demands effective access
control. Several proposals discuss access control for the IoT,
however, a limited focus is given to the emerging blockchain-
based solutions for IoT access control. In this paper, we review the
recent trends and critical needs for blockchain-based solutions
for IoT access control. We identify several important aspects of
blockchain, including decentralised control, secure storage and
sharing information in a trustless manner, for IoT access control
including their benefits and limitations. Finally, we note some
future research directions on how to converge blockchain in IoT
access control efficiently and effectively.
Index Terms—Internet of things, Blockchain, Access control,
Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The scale of the number of devices, applications, users,
and their associated services in an Internet of Things (IoT)
system is massive [1]. It is predicted that there will be 50
billion smart devices connected to the Internet by the end
of 2022. This will, in effect, increase the average number
of devices and connections per household and Internet user.
The annual global traffic is also predicted to reach 3.3ZB
(Zettabyte) per year by the end of 2021 [2]. While the spread
of various IoT applications provides better services, reduced
cost of applications, and improved user experience, they pose
significant security challenges to the system [3] [4] [5]. In IoT,
among other security issues, the question of access control
is paramount [6]. Access control can be seen as a security
mechanism that ensures the reliable access of resources only
by the authorised entities governed by a set of access control
policies. It places a selective restriction of access that regulates
who (e.g., an entity) can access or what (e.g., a resource)
can be accessed under certain conditions. [7]. In Figure 1, we
illustrate an outline of major components of an access control
process.
In IoT, the limited/portable device size, battery energy, and
processing speed increase the device’s vulnerability to network
attacks. This increased vulnearbility stems from the inability
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Fig. 1: Major components of an access control process.
to use well-established conventional security mechanisms di-
rectly to resource-constrained IoT devices [8]. Additionally,
the scale and heterogeneity of devices in IoT networks make
it difficult to specify, centrally and in advance, a complete set
of access control policies for both the users and devices.
A. Problem Description and Motivation
Most of today’s access control mechanisms in IoT are de-
veloped on three commonly used access control mechanisms:
Role Based Access Control (RBAC); Attribute Based Access
Control (ABAC); and Capability Based Access Control (Cap-
BAC). An outline of these three access control mechanisms
are illustrated in Figure 2.
The employment of RBAC can provide a fine-grained
access control over the resources explicitly using user-to-role
mappings. However, in RBAC, for every access to a resource,
there is a need to define separate user-to-permission relation.
Moreover, RBAC is highly centralised in nature, limiting its
scalability for large-scale dynamic systems like the IoT. This
further brings challenges towards the fine-grained permission
enforcement and attribute management within the IoT systems
to perform access control decisions. ABAC uses attributes to
improve the policy management rather than depending upon
the concrete unique identity of individual entities. This is
promising given that the policies are written based on the
context. In an IoT scenario this provides flexibility in policy
management but at the same time ABAC does not provide any
mechanism for controlling the number of policies required. In
other words, ABAC does not, for example, support mecha-
nisms for grouping together policies with different attribute
requirements that allow an access to a single resource or
policies with the same attribute requirements that allow access
to different resources. That said, ABAC requires a policy
management mechanism for efficient resource management
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Fig. 2: Commonly used access control mechanisms for the IoT.
policies rises significantly. This creates an issue for scalable
distribution of access control mechanisms to define a set of
attributes uniquely acceptable for each user, device and service
in a dynamic system like the IoT. CapBAC provides flexible
access control by distributing capability tokens (also known
as permission tokens) that contain access rights or privileges
(along with additional conditions). These capability tokens can
be validated at the edge IoT devices at the time of access
to a resource. In this case, the edge IoT devices do not
need to manage complex sets of policies. However, most of
the CapBAC systems are centralised for policy storing and
their management [9]. This further creates challenges for the
efficiency in attribute management and flexibility in access
rights transfer at scale.
The discussion above gives rise to five key features of access
control mechanisms in IoT: (1) resource management, (2)
access rights transfer, (3) permission enforcement, (4) attribute
management, and (5) scalability. These five features are critical
to characterise access control, ranging from the management
of resources to access control policy enforcement with proper
security controls as well as delegating access rights from
one entity to another in large-scale IoT systems. A detailed
discussion of these categories is given in Section III-B. Most
of the current access control approaches so far address some
but not all of these features adequately.
We note that access control in IoT requires consideration at
design phase critical IoT requirements, so that it can provide
scalable, efficient, light-weight, trustworthy and robust policy
enforcement mechanisms. The large-scale and heterogene-
ity of IoT networks demands the decentralisation of policy
management [10]. In recent years with the development of
blockchain technology, it can be seen that the blockchain
has the potential to address these issues in overcoming the
limitations of traditional access control mechanisms in a more
efficient and fine-grained way for large-scale IoT systems
spanning multiple jurisdictions [11]. In Figure 3, we depict
a conceptual view of blockchain-based IoT access control.
Blockchain delivers new opportunities by providing distributed
storage and a computational framework on which arbitrary
programs can be executed. Several properties of the blockchain
(e.g., no central authority and trusted third party, consensus
mechanism, immutable, irreversible and tamper-proof, acces-
sibility, auditability, etc.) offers a secure and safe way to
record and track a list of transactions for a large number of
devices in a highly transparent, auditable and efficient way
by maintaining a peer-to-peer network. This cannot simply be
achieved by the aforementioned commonly used access control
mechanisms e.g., RBAC, ABAC, and CapBAC [12] [13].
B. Contributions
Previous surveys in IoT access control (e.g., [14], [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20]) mostly discussed the traditional
view of access control mechanisms over a centralised in-
frastructure. These discussions are limited to the commonly
used access control mechanisms e.g., RBAC, ABAC, and
CapBAC. These surveys mainly point to access control aspects
from the perspective of various security requirements e.g.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, they are
more focused on general pervasive environments and limited
focus is given to significant IoT-related issues e.g., context
awareness, interoperability, transiency, scalability, trust, and
decentralisation.
While a few other proposals (e.g., [21], [22], [23], [24],
[25], [26], [27]) try to survey blockchain convergence in access
control for the IoT, they do not focus on the various distinct
properties of blockchain and their integration into IoT access
control to a fine-grained level. Their discussions do not focus
on key attributes that determine the suitability of an access
control approach for a given context, e.g., how access control
manages resources, whether it transfers access rights, how it
enforces permissions or manages attributes, and whether it is
scalable.
In this paper, we study the key features of blockchain
technology (e.g., decentralisation, distributed ledgers, consen-
sus, auditability, immutability, etc.) that makes it attractive
for IoT access control and address several challenges (e.g.,
interoperability, inefficiency, and lack of trust) in the conven-
tional mechanisms. In other words, our work takes the crucial
features of blockchain technology to explore how they address
the limitations of traditional access control mechanisms for
large-scale IoT systems. Our work is intended to provide an
outline on how to efficiently converge blockchain to improve
IoT access control. We focus on the key benefits and future
research issues via this integration.
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TABLE I: Previous surveys on IoT access control and their comparison with our work (BC = blockchain, AC = access control)










[14] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[15] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[16] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[17] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[18] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[19] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[20] 7 7 7 7 7 7
[21] D 7 7 7 7 7
[22] D 7 7 7 7 D
[23] D 7 7 7 7 D
[24] D 7 7 7 7 D
[25] D 7 7 7 7 7
[26] D 7 7 7 7 7
[27] D 7 7 7 7 D
[Our work] D D D D D D
In Table I, we compare our present work to the previous
surveys based on the two core categories: (a) whether the
proposals discuss the blockchain technology and how various
properties of blockchain can satisfy the access control needs
in IoT; and (b) the proposed blockchain-based access control
solutions for the IoT. For the latter, we use the five key
features of access control in IoT discussed above. The major
contributions of the paper can be summarised as follows:
• We provide a systematic literature review of the existing
blockchain-based solutions for IoT access control. Our
work bridges the gap between the access control need
in distributed environments and the traditional highly-
centralised mechanisms – it highlights, investigates, and
discusses the usefulness of blockchain in IoT access
control.
• Our work consider five key features of an access control
mechanism that are significant to consider in blockchain-
based access control solutions for the IoT. We provide a
critical analysis of how these are satisfied in the existing
literature.
• We provide a set of unique future research directions that
help to efficiently integrate blockchain-based solutions in
IoT access control.
C. Organisation and Roadmap
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we discuss the importance of access control for the IoT
systems. This includes the discussion of specific access control
needs in IoT. In Section III, we present the blockchain-based
solutions for IoT access control. At first, we discuss blockchain
technology in brief. Then we review the existing blockchain-
based IoT access control solutions by categorizing the specific
access control issue they address. In Section IV, we provide
a discussion of lessons learned. We also highlight the future
research directions for using blockchain in IoT access control.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section V.
II. IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS CONTROL IN IOT
With the rapid improvements in the IoT, there is a huge
growth in the number of devices per user in recent years [28].
Moreover, the intelligence of smart IoT devices to sense,
connect, and communicate with other devices make it more
promising to apply in many areas than ever before. In such
a context, anything and everything can be part of the net-
work (e.g. via the Internet). This emphasizes the pervasive
instrumentation of physical objects combined with smart de-
vices [29]. In the IoT, devices and things may, over their
lifetime, interact with a vast range of other things. Such
interactions may be fleeting and may only occur once between
a particular pair of things or be much more frequent and
long term [30]. Things will likely be highly mobile, espe-
cially devices, moving from administrative domain to another
administrative domain. These domains will have to establish
policies and mechanisms to enable them to deal with devices
and things about which they have very limited, if any, previous
information [31]. Note, for our purposes a thing is one or a
set of users, devices, services and applications, and similar
entities.
IoT systems may deal with high volumes of data. This
data can be particularly sensitive, as it may include health,
location, and other personal information [32]. Activities that
are currently not digitally enabled will be supported and
others expanded by the edge intelligence and ubiquity of the
devices that constitute the IoT [33]. For example, shopping
may be enhanced by services offered by things deployed by the
retailers, contacting user devices and offering information and
discounts. Current services, e.g., e-tickets, may be enhanced
by sensors detecting e-ticket holders and controlling physical
access on that basis. Healthcare may be expanded by a range
of sensors attached to a person [34].
Many of the vulnerabilities in IoT are associated with, (1)








































Fig. 3: Access control in IoT based on blockchain technology.
users and devices, (3) different network domains, and (4)
dynamic network topology where the interactions between the
things may happen only once and or a very short interval of
time. Even the unavailability of a network connection where
devices are unable to get the latest software patches can
generate attacks on these resource-limited devices [35]. There
are several other characteristics of IoT e.g., openness, data
freshness, self-healing etc. which increases the complexity and
difficulty in protecting an IoT system from potential threats
and attacks using conventional security mechanisms [36].
Attacks on IoT systems are fundamentally different from
the traditional security and privacy related attacks in general
computing systems. In IoT, attacks are becoming more sophis-
ticated in terms of their mechanisms and the way they infect
the system [37] [38] [39] [40]. This is not simply limited
to penetrate a network layer with malicious codes or divert
network traffic to another insecure destination without the
knowledge of the users. It is more pronounced where an IoT-
enabled medical device can be compromised and controlled
remotely by the attacker. For instance, a patient’s pacemaker
can be used to generate a fatal shock, or a drug infusion pump
(e.g. insulin or antibiotics) can be controlled by an attacker to
change the drug dosage with the authorized access [41]. In
2016, an attack called ‘Mirai Botnet’ [42] infected numerous
IoT devices (in particular older routers and IP cameras) then
flooded them with network traffic with a DDoS (Distributed
Denial-of-Service) attack. In 2017, ‘Cayla’ doll [43] was
banned in Germany for its immense privacy and security
concerns. Cayla is an IoT-connected doll that provides children
with a connected play experience by listening and talking to
them. However, it can be a potential privacy threat as the
dolls can be heavily compromised due to its insecure nature
of Bluetooth connection. In Finland, in 2016, there was a
complete shut down to the central heating and hot water
systems using DDoS attack [44]. These incidents show the
range of potential attack scenarios where a common IoT device
can be compromised to infiltrate and attack larger networks.
Therefore, placing appropriate security mechanisms and
enforcing proper access control policies for the IoT systems
become important issues [45]. Moreover, access control must
be placed in a way that can easily reach the edge of the
IoT devices. There is a need to decentralize architecture
that supports efficient control of accessing resources with the
minimum number of policy requirements. That said, there is a
significant need to prevent and control the unauthorised flow of
information, and to develop appropriate security mechanisms
for IoT access control to ensure proper security foundation
for an IoT system [46] [47] [48] [49]. As discussed above,
the existing access control solutions for the IoT do not
meet the critical access control requirements, for example,
decentralisation of control, scalability, and trust to a fine-
grained level. Unfortunately, having a central point is common
to a number of access control mechanisms in the existing
proposals. What is even more common in such proposals in the
literature is a single, particular means of policy evaluation. We
note that a platform using blockchain can be used to efficiently
handle such issues. The use of blockchain can constitute
another step towards a robust distributed access control system
that would overcome many of the challenges associated with
centralisation, either in the form of a single entity calculating
access control policies, or reliance on a single method for
access rights.
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR IOT ACCESS
CONTROL
In this section, first, we briefly discuss blockchain technol-
ogy and then we present the various blockchain-based access
control solutions for IoT proposed in recent literature.
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Fig. 4: A simple view of formation of blocks in a blockchain network.
A. Blockchain Technology
Blockchain originated as the fundamental technology be-
hind Bitcoin, the first cryptocurrency [50]. Blockchain es-
tablishes a trusted network over untrusted participants where
transactions, i.e., communications between nodes, is verified
by all participants. Blockchain eliminates the need for cen-
tralised controllers as all participating nodes jointly manage
the network by storing and verifying new transactions and
blocks. Blockchain achieves distributed management as all
nodes maintain the history of transactions in the form of
chained blocks. Blockchain is immutable as each block main-
tains the hash of the previous block in the ledger, thus, any
modification to the previously stored data will be detected (see
Figure 4). The first block in the ledger is known as the genesis
block. The blocks are organised by logical time stamps and
synchronized among other member nodes within the network.
Particular nodes in the network, known as miners or validators,
collect new transactions and append them in the blockchain
in the form of a block after following a consensus algorithm.
The latter ensures that the validator of the next block is chosen
randomly which in turn ensures the blockchain security. The
consensus algorithm normally involves solving a puzzle which
demands resources which in turn protects the network against
malicious nodes that may flood the network with fake blocks.
The consensus algorithm ensures all nodes agree on the
valid state of the ledger in two steps: (1) validator selection:
this step is basically known as consensus algorithm in the
literature and refers to selecting the validator of the next block,
and (2) ledger agreement: due to the distributed nature of
the blockchain multiple nodes may generate the same block
simultaneously leading to creation of a fork in the network.
In such cases, the blockchain relies on the concept of the
longest ledger to achieve consensus over the state of the ledger.
Once a fork happens, the validators pick one block randomly.
Eventually, one ledger will end up with more blocks which
will be considered as the valid block in the network [51].
Blockchain technology can enrich IoT by providing a plat-
form for sharing information in a trustless manner due to
its salient features including immutability, auditability, and
accountability. The history of the transactions is permanently
stored in the blockchain and is stored by the participating
nodes which in turn introduces a high-level of auditability.
The distributed nature of the blockchain complements IoT in
various ways including reliability, security, accountability, and
scalability [52].
In recent years, blockchain-based access control received
tremendous attention due to the fundamental features of
blockchain including auditability, distributed management,
trust, and immutability. For example, multiple blockchain
based solutions for IoT have been developed including, Bosch
XDK (Cross Domain Development Kit) [53] for collecting
real-time cross-domain data, and Hyundai Digital Asset Com-
pany (HDAC) [54] for quick authentication and data storage
between IoT devices.
B. Blockchain-Based Solutions
The integration and use of blockchain with IoT is promis-
ing in several ways by ensuring the consistent ledger
shared across the distributed network and verified transac-
tions [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]. This has advantages in
managing access control mechanisms. In Figure 5, we show
various benefits blockchain in IoT access control [61] [62]. In
this section, we discussed the various blockchain-based access
control solutions for the IoT across five critical features of
access control that we find significant, they are, (1) resource
management, (2) access rights transfer, (3) permission en-
forcement, (4) attribute management, and (5) scalability. In
Figure 6, we show a summary of these features. Resource
management is vital given the limited battery, memory, and
processing capacity of IoT devices. Transfer of access rights
denotes sending access control permissions (and any other
conditions associated with that access) from one entity to
another. It is important for enforcing access control delegation
to the edge IoT devices. Permission enforcement must be
tailored based on the needs of an IoT system. It is a key
feature of access control systems to deal with flexibility
in policy management. Attribute management, in particular,
crucial given the uncertainty present an IoT system. The
use of attributes can manage the identity of the entities (or
even uncertainty in observations from physical and digital
data) at scale that do not depend upon a unique concrete
identity of an entity. Lastly, the importance of scalability in
IoT access control cannot be overstated due to the robustness

















Fig. 5: Several benefits of using blockchain for IoT access control.
edge IoT/fog nodes. In Table II, we show the categorisation.
A discussion of each of these issues along with the blockchain-
based access control proposals are discussed as follows.
1) Resource Management: In an IoT access control per-
spective, smart devices will come in many forms and provide
a vast range of services to both their users and other entities
within the system. IoT systems should provision efficient
management of computing storage/resources and their allo-
cation and sharing. Users also wish to efficiently access these
resources, and quickly and precisely obtain the services they
require in a secure and distributed environment. The devices
will, for the foreseeable future, present relatively low-power
capacities and resource management requirements must be
tailored to this [80]. To this end, there is a high demand
to build an efficient resource management framework that
composed of a vast number of IoT devices. In order to
provide a more flexible and adaptive resource management
framework for access control in IoT, the use of blockchain
can be an alternative to the commonly used centralised access
control systems. Recall, that blockchain removes the control
from a centralised node and provides more flexibility in
resource management for a number of scenarios including
supply chain, transportation, and energy sectors, consists of
a vast amount of IoT devices. The use of blockchain in such
cases cryptographically guarantees the data’s irreversible and
unforgeable characteristics through smart contracts. To address
the resource management issues in access control for large-
scale IoT systems, Novo [63] presents an architecture for
resource management of IoT devices supported by blockchain.
The architecture is fully distributed in nature leverage the
properties of blockchain technology (cf. Figure 7). The access
control policies are enforced within the blockchain. The pro-
posed design operates a single smart contract which reduces
the communication overhead among the nodes, and at the same
time significantly optimize resources. It also provides access
control in real-time to the edge IoT devices. Note, all entities
in the system are part of the blockchain network except the
IoT devices. This is due to the resource-constrained nature of
the IoT devices, where the devices cannot store the heavy-
weight blockchain information. The proposed architecture is
able to manage a vast amount of IoT devices and provide a
decentralised feature of access control that connects a high
number of geographically distributed sensor networks. The
access control policies are enforced based on blockchain
technology overcoming the bottleneck of a single centralised
authority that manages the access control decisions.
In this model, the edge IoT devices do not belong to the
blockchain network, they are connected to the blockchain us-
ing one or more management hubs. These hubs are distributed
over the entire blockchain network and potentially connected
in different ways to the IoT devices which notably provide
considerable flexibility in the overall access control by the
utilisation of resources to a fine-grained process of access
to data. Significantly, this model brings computing resources
to the edge of the IoT network with a secure distribution
of resources for the edge nodes. The use of blockchain
simplify the network traffic in the core network, as well as
provides a minimal end-to-end latency, response time and
higher throughput.
Another proposal [64] discusses a smart contract-based
access control framework for IoT. In this framework, several
‘access control contracts’ for access control between users
and resources are computed inside the blockchain network. To
control access between multiple resources, the access control
contract validates the dynamic access rights based upon the
behaviour of the subjects. The proposal discusses a resource
sharing mechanism that takes the advantages of blockchain
smart contracts. The user simply needs to store the access
control rules for a given resource and the blockchain will
manage access to that resource to the other users. It uses
Representational State Transfer (REST) design pattern in com-
bination with IoT Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) to
enable resource cooperation between the users. Similar to [63],
in this proposal access control management is performed
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Fig. 6: Critical features of access control identified for IoT in blockchain-based solutions.
within the blockchain network. Nuss et al. [65] present a
blockchain-based storage and access management framework
for large-scale IoT systems. This proposal first investigates the
current challenges of identity, storage, and access management
issues in IoT and then employs blockchain to examine how
those challenges can be controlled. The proposal addresses
the increased demand for secure and comprehensive storage
and resource management issues in IoT as well as discusses
the question of interoperability between heterogeneous and
resource-constrained devices using blockchain technology. It
uses block size adaptation scheme to address the resource
allocation issue that operates in a distributed way to relieve
the load of edge nodes. The proposed system enables efficient
interoperability between the users and the devices by a variety
of resource optimisation scheme that helps to identify the
data sources that in turn assist reliable and efficiency of
edge resource management. Further, it addresses the scalability
issue in terms of network and storage consumption.
2) Access Rights Transfer: Access control transfer is sig-
nificant as it helps to provide certain access from one entity to
another with specific access rights. For instance, a mechanic
being granted rights to a car’s systems is able to carry out
maintenance as directed by the car’s owner. Generally, the
transfer of access rights from one entity to another is known as
delegation. In a delegation, the entity that transfers the access
rights is known as the delegator and the entity that receives
the delegated access rights is known as the delegatee. In large-
scale and highly mobile systems, e.g., the IoT, delegation plays
a vital role in ensuring flexible, fine-grained, and responsive
access to resources by allowing users to propagate access in
a controlled fashion. However, in the case of an IoT system
it difficult to specify, centrally and in advance, the complete
set of access control policies in a trustworthy manner. There
are a few proposals that devise delegation of access rights in
general IoT, but they overlook the crucial aspects of ownership
of delegation. Recent proposals try to address this issue using
blockchain where the propagation of delegation (especially,
the delegation chain) can be easily verified.
Proposal [66] discusses an access control model for IoT
using CapBAC to the resources, namely ‘BlendCAC’. In this
access control model, a capability-based delegation mech-
anism is discussed for the propagation of access control
permissions based on the blockchain network. In particular,
the authorisation mechanism of delegation is computed inside
the blockchain. Le and Mutka [67] propose a blockchain-based
decentralised model for delegation access rights in IoT, named
‘CapChain’. This allows users to share and delegate their
access rights efficiently and seamlessly to other IoT devices
in public but still maintain privacy and user’s identity by the
secure distribution of keys leveraging the use of blockchain
transactions. Similar to [66], this scheme uses capabilities for
access rights delegation over the blockchain networks. Here,
every IoT device in the network contains at least one owner
who has full control over the device and is capable of generat-
ing capabilities based on the access control policies specified
by the system. The capabilities are then transferred from one
device to another via blockchain transactions. An experimental
setup is provided with evaluation results to support the design.
Unlike [66], which uses an identity-based capability token
management strategy to protect users’ privacy, proposal [67]
uses an anonymous crypto-currency blockchain systems that
ensures user’s privacy by hiding sensitive information (e.g.,
identity).
Pal et al. [68] discuss the critical issue of access control
delegation in an IoT system supported by blockchain technol-
ogy and propose a flexible decentralised delegation model for
transferring access rights in an IoT system. Using capability,
access rights are transferred from one entity to another based
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TABLE II: Comparison of various blockchain-based access control mechanisms proposed for the IoT based on the certain
features of access control they addressed.
Reference Resource Access Rights Permission Attribute Scalability
Management Transfer Enforcement Management
[63] Yes No Edge Smart contract No
(device identity)
[64] Yes No Edge Smart contract No
(device identity)
[65] Yes No Centralised Smart contract No
(device identity)
[66] Yes Yes (capability) Edge Smart contract No
(device identity)
[67] No Yes (key-based) Centralised Smart contract No
(device identity)
[68] [69] Yes Yes (capability) Edge Smart-contract Yes
(attribute-based)
[70] No No Edge PoW No
(trust-based)
[71] No No Edge Smart contract No
(enryption-based)
[72] Yes No Edge Smart contract No
& centralised (device identity)
[73] No No Edge Smart contract Yes
(device identity)
[74] No No Edge Smart-contract Yes
(attribute-based)
[75] No No Edge Smart contract No
(attribute-based)
[76] No No Edge Smart contract Yes
& centralised (attribute-based)
[77] No No Edge Smart contract Yes
(device identity)
[78] No No Edge Smart contract Yes
(device identity)
[79] No No Edge Smart contract Yes
& centralised (device identity)
on certain policies. Access rights (and other conditions) are
embedded inside the capability token and the access rights
(and the conditions) are evaluated at the edge IoT devices
during the time of accessing a resource. In this proposal, an
evaluation of access rights is performed outside the blockchain
network. This is significant when we consider a large-scale
system like the IoT and their associated policy settings for
individual access control issues for edge IoT devices. In [69],
Pal et al. extend the proposed blockchain-based access control
platform of [68] to a ‘dual-blockchain’ platform that combines
a private and a public blockchain (cf. Figure 8). This increases
flexibility to protect users’ privacy as the sensitive attributes
are stored inside an attribute provider which is managed by
the private blockchain. In other words, the proposed dual-
blockchain architecture moves the attribute storage and access
of the public blockchain onto a secure private blockchain. A
bridging program is used based on a load balancing or leader
election algorithm that links these two blockchains. Notably,
these two blockchains maintain sustainable access control
decisions independently. They provide adequate security and at
the same time maintain the confidentiality and integrity of data.
Both the proposals [68] and [69] are asynchronous, distributed,
and use attribute-based identity when delegating access rights
from one entity to another. In other words, the delegation is
identity-less in nature, which argues for the use of non-unique
identities in the delegation. This is important given the diverse
nature and scale of an IoT system. Significantly, different
from [66] and [67], in these cases the blockchain events are
used as capabilities (also referred to as permission or access
token) to facilitate access control delegation to IoT devices
whereby the generated capabilities are issued by the smart
contracts without the involvement of any trusted third-party
authentication. An Internet business model (involving owner
and buyer) is used to discuss the feasibility of the solutions in
a real-world scenario. A detailed implementation is provided.
3) Permission Enforcement: Enforcing proper access con-
trol permissions among a large number of distributed IoT

























Fig. 7: An IoT access control architecture based on blockchain presented in [63].
use of blockchain in such cases provides more flexibility and
robustness. Smart contracts are used to monitor and enforce
of access control permissions under complex conditions [81].
Furthermore, blockchain shows the potential of enforcing
distributed access control permissions expressing the right
to access a resource at a fine-grained level. Ali et al. [70]
discuss an approach of permission-based access control for
blockchain-based IoT systems. The proposed approach lever-
ages the decentralised nature of blockchain for permission
enforcement between the entities within the system. The main
motivation of this study is to establish trust between the entities
while removing the central trusted authority to maintain the
trust degrees for each entity that controls and monitors access
control enforcement. This is achieved by the use of PoW - the
consensus mechanism of blockchain. To provide a light-weight
solution, access rights are assigned to a node with a minimum
number of permissions. No proof of concept implementation
is detailed.
Shafagh et al. [71] present a blockchain-based design for the
IoT systems that provides distributed access control and access
rights. The authors identify three requirements that are essen-
tial for such design: secure data storage, IoT compatibility, and
decentralised access rights management. The design enhances
blockchain technology to manage ownership and data sharing
between the owners and the IoT devices. Owners can create
new transactions to the blockchain that contains the identifier
of the data stream and the service’s public key. When a user
wants to revoke access rights from a specific user, it changes
the encryption key and shares the new key with all authorised
services over the blockchain network, except the one that is
revoked. This ensures flexibility in access control permission
enforcement for large-scale IoT systems by introducing a set of
separate permissions at each stage of an access control process.
No implementation detail of the proposed design is provided.
Like [71], Algarni et al. [72] present an access control
model for the IoT based on blockchain. This provides a light-
weight and decentralised secure access control framework for
enforcing access control permissions using smart contracts.
The core objective of the proposed model is to provide secure
communication and trustworthy policy enforcement between
the edge IoT devices supported by the underlying blockchain
properties e.g., scalability, auditability, and transparency. A
private hierarchical blockchain structure is taken into consider-
ation to achieve more fine-grained permission enforcement in
different level of access (e.g., at user level and blockchain
level). In user level, cryptographic operations are used. In
blockchain level, light-weight consensus mechanisms are used
for permission enforcement based on various IoT requirements
for access control.
Ali et al. [73] propose a ‘Light-weight Scalable Blockchain’
solution for low-resourced IoT devices known as LSB. It
is employed to optimize IoT requirements and efficient per-
mission enforcement using a Distributed Throughput Man-
agement (DTM) algorithm. LSB incorporates three levels of
optimisations which are: (1) lightweight consensus algorithm
that requires the validators to wait for a random period of
time before committing new blocks to the blockchain, (2)
distributed trust where the processing overhead required for
verifying the transactions and blocks is reduced as nodes































Access Request / Response
Fig. 8: An IoT access control architecture based on a dual-blockchain concept presented in [68].
the historical behavior of the nodes, and (3) a distributed
throughput management algorithm that ensures blockchain
can achieve self-scaling feature. LSB divides the participating
nodes into clusters and the Cluster Heads (CH) manage the
blockchain. LSB incorporates access control in blockchain-
level where CH manage access to the cluster members. Each
CH maintains an access control list that indicates which public
keys (i.e., users in the overlay) can access a particular cluster
member. The access control list is populated by the cluster
members.
4) Attribute Management: Management of attributes (e.g.,
location, date, time, etc.) is significant to provide a decentral-
ized, flexible, and fine-grained authorisation for IoT devices.
Attributes are significant as they are used to express specified
access policies by a target to decide if the requested entity
fulfills the required privileges that are necessary for access.
Blockchain is utilized in such cases that allow authentic
and reliable credentials. It is possible to use the blockchain
property where verifiable collaboration mechanisms are con-
trolled using edge IoT devices. Furthermore, blockchain is
used to record and distribute attributes in order to avoid data
tampering and a single point of failure. Liu et al. [74] present a
decentralised, fine-grained, and dynamic access control system
to provide efficient attribute management for large-scale IoT
systems supported by blockchain. The proposed system is
called ‘Fabric-IoT’, which is based on the Hyperledger Fabric
blockchain framework and takes advantage of an ABAC
system. In this model, smart contracts are created to control
and manage the access control policies both for the admin and
end-users. These three smart contacts are: (1) Device Contract
(DC) (2) Policy Contract (PC), and (3) Access Contract (AC).
DC provides a method that helps to store the unique URLs
of selected resources generated by certain IoT devices. PC is
responsible for managing and enforcing ABAC policies for
admin users. Finally, AC contains the core access control
methods that are used for the end-users. Simulation-based
experimental studies are performed to show the applicability
and to ensure data consistency of the proposed system in real-
world IoT settings.
With a similar concept of [74], Sun et al. [75] propose an
attribute management framework for IoT access control sup-
ported by ABAC. In this proposal, the IoT system is divided
into different functional domains. Then a local blockchain
ledger has been established for each of the domains. The
local blockchain ledger records domain entities, e.g., attributes,
access decisions, etc. This will help to enable more IoT devices
as blockchain nodes. It uses an identity-based signature to
serve cross-domain access requests that are coming from
legitimate users from each IoT domain.
Employing blockchain to implement an access control
mechanism based on attributes, e.g., the one associated with
ABAC, would likely require attributes to be stored in the
blockchain. Storing of attributes to the blockchain raises
questions of adequate privacy as all users can see all entries in
the blockchain. To address this issue, Zhang et al. [76] propose
an attribute-based access control framework that addresses
the privacy-aware and efficient distribution and management
of attributes using blockchain for large-scale IoT systems.
Blockchain is used to provide a trustworthy environment for
transmitting access information. In other words, blockchain is
used to deliver authentic and reliable credentials. To support a
controlled access authorisation a trusted collaborative mecha-
nism is implemented. The collaboration has happened between
the ABAC and blockchain. This proposal also provides a light-
weight, decentralised access control solution where the IoT
devices only need to store a string of access information to
perform an authorisation task. It is also worth mentioning
that the proposals [68] and [69] use attributes to validate an
entity in the systems rather than depending upon their unique
concrete identity. It is useful in many cases where an entity
does not need to share or delegate their unique identity and can
simply use the notion on attribute-based identity management.
5) Scalability: There is a growing trend that examines



















Fig. 9: Fog computing for IoT access control in blockchain-based solutions.
fog computing technologies for IoT access control [82]. In
Figure 9, we illustrate a conceptual view of employing fog
computing for IoT access control in blockchain-based solu-
tions. Recall that blockchain provides a distributed ledger for
strong access to information and is decentralised in nature.
This reinforces the decentralised requirement of access control
in the IoT. The use of fog computing in IoT systems enhanced
the use of traditional cloud computing technology for aggre-
gating, processing, and analyzing heavy network traffic and
workload. Fog nodes are used as a local controller located
in a close distance of the edge IoT devices, acting as an
intermediate layer between the edge IoT nodes and cloud
servers [83] [84] [85] [86]. Fog computing can be seen as
an extension of cloud computing which provides a highly
scalable and dynamic visualised platform for processing,
strong and networking services between the cloud and the
edge network [87]. Traditional cloud computing technology
is widely used for aggregating, processing, and analyzing
heavy network traffic and workload. However, in the case
of IoT devices, cloud computing is not preferred platform in
terms of responsiveness and intermediate processing of the IoT
data. This further reinforces the resource-constrained nature
of the IoT devices. In such a case, fog nodes can be seen
as a local controller that is placed in close proximity to the
edge IoT devices (e.g., geo-distributed fog servers) and it is
primarily responsible for the local aggregation, processing, and
analyzing the IoT data. As such, the fog architecture provides
an intermediate layer between the edge IoT nodes and cloud
servers. Moreover, fog provides efficient, delay-sensitive, and
location-aware services for the edge IoT devices [88].
Proposal [77] discusses the concept of blockchain-enabled
fog nodes that are used with the IoT devices to provide more
flexible access control. This leverages flexibility to access
control by considering the resource-constrained nature of the
IoT devices. The fog nodes are used to enhance the scalability
of the system where the heavy computational takes related
to authentication and communicating with the blockchain
network are carried out by the fog nodes. This improves
the performance of the IoT devices. Fundamentally, the fog
nodes interface to Ethereum smart contracts to authenticate
the legitimate users to access resources (i.e., IoT devices).
The proposed architecture is able to manage a vast amount
of IoT devices and provide a decentralised feature of access
control that connects a high number of IoT devices. The access
control policies are enforced based on blockchain technology
overcoming the bottleneck of a single centralised authority that
manages the access control decisions. In this model, the edge
IoT devices do not connect to the blockchain network directly,
instead, they are connected to the blockchain using one or
more management hubs. These hubs are distributed over the
blockchain and potentially connected in different ways to the
IoT devices which significantly provide considerable flexibility
in the overall access control management.
In a similar vision to [77], Farhadi et al. [78] discuss a
blockchain-enabled fog architecture to allow secure access
control in IoT applications. For a set of for nodes a dedicated
controller is defined. The proposed solution is based on
a multi-data owner and multi-service provider environment.
Where these are distributed over a wide area. A high con-
ceptual view of a fog blockchain manager is discussed that
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is composed of fog nodes and a blockchain network govern
by a set of controllers. A fog-to-fog consensus mechanisms is
discussed to employ these security features in access control.
No implementation is provided. In this work, IoT access
control security is outlined with the following five dimen-
sions: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation,
and availability.
Riabi et al. [79] discuss an approach for distributed access
control over fog computing for the IoT systems. In this
approach, IoT nodes are connected to a local controller (a
fog controller) which is able to perform heavy computation
processing and synchronizes with the cloud servers. These
controllers can be seen as the collaborative agents that helps
integration of IoT nodes and cloud platforms. This provides
flexibility in access control of data to a more granular level
that are coming from multiple sources. A unified set of
access control policies dedicated to an access is supplied to
each controller. This in turn reduces both administrative and
processing overheads of the system by a scalable distribution
of computational power and storage capacity.
IV. DISCUSSION
Several proposals discuss the need for IoT access control
and specific requirements and dedicated frameworks. That
said, access control in IoT is application-specific and it re-
quires dedicated infrastructures and contexts within which
it will function. Table III summarises the access control
proposals for IoT based on blockchain that are discussed above
based on their purposes, key contributions, and whether they
are implemented.However, we have observed that there is
no complete solution that can cover every aspect of an IoT
system to determine secure access control by specifying its
requirements [89]. Conventional access control mechanisms
are not directly applicable in IoT due to its unique features,
including resource constrained devices and dynamic charac-
teristics. Access control requirements are different in various
levels of IoT system at a fine-grained level.
Blockchain has the potential to drive the access control
issues in IoT to address the limitations of the conventional
solutions and to a higher extent to provide more flexibility,
scalability, control, trust, and security [90]. Due to specific
requirements of IoT, the use of blockchain-based solutions
needs to be focused on a particular issue and infrastructure on
which the access control is applied. Blockchain is immutable
and auditable which facilitates access control management.
The immutability of the blockchain makes it impossible for
malicious nodes to modify access control rules. The auditabil-
ity of the blockchain ensures that all interactions between
nodes, and thus access to the data, is reflected in blockchain.
Thus, an attempt to access data or unauthorised access to the
data will be recorded in the ledger which in turn enables the
data/resource owner to detect the malicious activity and protect
their resource [91] [92].
Among others, we have noted that the intrinsic features of
blockchain helps in resource management by optimizing the
resource utilisation rate and at the same time reducing the cost
of the heavy-weight centralised service providers, transfer of
access right from one entity to another entity, efficient en-
forcement of access control policies, management of attributes,
and successively enhanced the scalability of fog nodes. These
features are significant as access control decisions are highly
dependent upon them. That said, blockchain can allow a
platform for data collection and pass the collected data among
IoT devices in a transparent and trustworthy fashion (by
providing a verifiable and secure recording). For instance, with
the provision of distributed computing and storage resource
management for IoT access control using blockchain allows
resource constraint IoT devices to perform local authorisation
decisions in a faster way. In this, the authorisation chain can
be verified inside the blockchain network in a decentralised
manner and the access control conditions can be verified
locally by the edge IoT devices [93].
As noted above, using blockchain, this way of decentralised
of access control can be an alternative for most of the cen-
tralised access control mechanisms, e.g., RBAC and ABAC.
Recall, in RBAC and ABAC policy management and their in-
formants are highly centralised and therefore it imposes several
limitations when designing access control for a highly dynamic
and scalable system like IoT, including single point of failure
and many to one traffic nature. In Table IV, we illustrate how
blockchain-based access control for IoT addresses different
salient features of access control requirements compared to
the traditional RBAC, ABAC, and CapBAC mechanisms.
In Table V, we illustrate the major advantages and disad-
vantages between blockchain and traditional access control
mechanisms (e.g., RBAC, ABAC and CapBAC). However,
based on the previous discussion, there are several open issues
that must be addressed for a secure, efficient and robust access
control for the IoT using blockchain-based systems in the
future. We list them as follows:
A. Policy Management
In a highly dynamic and mobile system like the IoT, where
there may be a large number of devices, being able to easily
identify them, both uniquely and as groups and to provide
access to the resources are challenging. Access control for
the IoT requires the inclusion of proper policy enforcement
mechanisms, which must define how the system should inter-
act with other systems and entities [27]. We argue that this can
be achieved by the underlying security policies determined by
the policy decision component of the system. However, the
challenge is how to place this policy decision component in a
decentralised way to leverage the edge intelligence of the IoT
devices [94].
This enhances the specific requirements of the policy set-
tings, including how policies are written and the correspond-
ing permissions are granted [19]. For instance, in an IoT-
enabled smart healthcare setting that is spread over multiple
domains, cooperation and communication between different
actors, clinical establishments and hospital management are
crucial to share information seamlessly when communicating
with one another. A significant research issue in this area
is, how to manage access control policies in a flexible and
fine-grained way for the IoT at scale without the need for a
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TABLE III: Summary of access control mechanisms for the IoT based on blockchain technology
Reference Year Purposes Key Contribution Implementation
[63] 2018 Building an access control model for IoT using
blockchain considering the resource constrained
nature of the IoT devices.
Develops an access control architecture for
scalable management of IoT devices using
blockchain.
Yes
[64] 2019 Examining the employment of smart contracts
for IoT access control.
Proposes a smart contract based access con-
trol framework for IoT using supported by
blockchain.
No
[65] 2018 Investigate the storage, identity, and access man-
agement issues for large-scale IoT systems using
blockchain-based solutions.
Proposes a secure access control management
framework for heterogeneous IoT systems sup-
ported by blockchain, especially focused on re-
source constrained IoT devices.
No
[66] 2018 Examining access right delegation issue in IoT
using blockchain.
Develops a delegation architecture called ‘Blend-
CAC’ for IoT using capabilities (as access to-
kens) and blockchain networks.
Yes
[67] 2018 Examining the use of capabilities (as access
tokens) for transferring of access rights over the
blockchain networks.
Develops an access control architecture called
‘CapChain’. that allows users to share and dele-
gate their access rights efficiently and seamlessly
to IoT devices.
Yes
[68] [69] 2020 Examining the access control delegation issues
(i.e., transferring of access rights from one entity
to another) for large-scale IoT systems using
blockchain.
Develops a duel-blockchain based access con-
trol architecture that is asynchronous in nature,
decentralised and supported by attribute based
identity.
Yes
[70] 2019 Addressing the identity and access management
issues in IoT using blockchain.
Presents a blockchain-based identity and access
management framework for large-scale IoT sys-
tems.
No
[71] 2017 Examining the suitability of blockchain for dis-
tributed access control and data management in
the IoT.
Proposes a decentralised access control man-
agement for information sharing in IoT using
blockchain.
No
[72] 2021 Building a secure communication and trustwor-
thy policy enforcement between the edge IoT
devices supported by the underlying blockchain
properties e.g., scalability, auditability, and trans-
parency.
Proposes a light-weight and decentralised secure
access control framework for enforcing access
control permissions using blockchain smart con-
tracts.
Yes
[73] 2019 Building a low-resourced consuming distributed
time-based consensus algorithm to reduce pro-
cessing overheads for verifying blocks of a
blockchain network to provide fine-grained ac-
cess control to large-scale IoT systems.
Proposes a ‘Light-weight Scalable Blockchain’
solution for IoT systems called as LSB con-
sidering requirements of the low-resourced IoT
devices and end-to-end security.
Yes
[74] 2020 Examining the use of blockchain for access
control and policy management for large-scale
IoT systems.
Develops an access control framework called
‘Fabric-IoT’ that provides a decentralised, fine-
grained and dynamic access control manage-
ment for large-scale IoT systems supported by
blockchain.
Yes
[75] 2021 Addressing the access control issues in IoT sys-
tems using blockchain over different functional
domains.
Proposes an attribute-managed access control
framework for IoT using blockchain that sup-
ports cross-domain access requests.
No
[76] 2020 Examining privacy-aware access control and ef-
ficient distribution and management of attributes
using blockchain for large-scale IoT systems.
Proposes an attribute-based collaborative access
control scheme using blockchain for IoT devices.
Yes
[77] 2018 Examining how to enhance the scalability of an
IoT system where the heavy computational takes
are carried out by the fog nodes.
Proposes a framework that leverages flexibility
to access control by considering resource con-
strained nature of the IoT devices supported by
fog nodes.
Yes
[78] 2019 Examining data security in IoT access control
using fog computing.
Proposes a blockchain-enabled fog architecture
that provides a secure access control in IoT
applications.
No
[79] 2017 Examining the use of fog nodes for heavy com-
putational processing for IoT.
Develops a distributed and fine-grained access




TABLE IV: Comparison of access control requirements in blockchain-based access control and the commonly used access
control mechanisms for the IoT systems. (AC = access control, BC = blockchain)
AC Requirements RBAC ABAC CapBAC BC-based
Scalability Low Medium High High
Ease of use Medium High High High
Choice of architecture Centralised Centralised Distributed Distributed
Data trust High Medium Low High
Continual control Medium High High High
Security High Medium Low High
Support for integration Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross domain access control No No Yes Yes
centralised component. This supports the use of blockchain
for managing access control and efficient policy management
in a decentralised way. There is a need for a policy man-
agement framework for blockchain to publish policies that
can efficiently express the rights to access a resource and at
the same time secure the distributed transfer of such access
rights between the entities. In addition, managing access
control policies in blockchain transforms the policy evaluation
process to executable smart contracts which leverages several
advantages of security features of reliability, traceability, and
information integrity [95].
B. Trust Management
The scale of the IoT systems makes it necessary to question
certain aspects of traditional approaches to trust manage-
ment [96] [97]. However, managing trust in an IoT context
is difficult. Heterogeneity and high dynamics in the systems
bring new challenges to establish a trustworthy environment
that further reinforces the absence of proper trust mechanisms
in the IoT. It is important to quantify the perception of trust and
the corresponding access control permissions that are context-
sensitive, subjective, and in many cases vary in different ways
based on the social issues [98]. Contextual information must
be also taken into consideration at the time of trust value
verification and update, further complicating the situation [99].
In IoT, the interaction between the entities may be for a
very short period of time and the entities may be interact-
ing only once for their entire life-time. In other cases, the
interactions may be very frequent and may be for a longer
period of time. Further, we note that the IoT devices are in
general resource constrained. They have limited battery power,
memory capacity and processing speed [100]. Therefore, it
is often not possible to store extensive interaction history or
employ traditional heavy-weight security mechanisms in those
devices for trust evaluation. It could be argued that, given
the potentially highly unpredictable nature of interactions and
uncertainty present in data (physical and digital data) that are
coming from multiple sources in an IoT system, the need for
trust in enforcing access control mechanisms is even greater
in such systems [101] [102] [103]. That said, in many cases,
employing a centralised trusted authority is not feasible in the
IoT [104].
In this context, a significant challenge is to develop a trust
management framework for IoT access control to deal with
uncertainty present in such a decentralised system, e.g., multi-
agent systems, where autonomous entities (e.g., agents) need
to perform individual tasks, either for themselves or on behalf
of a human user. In other words, given the desirable properties
of trust (e.g., dynamic, content-dependent, transitive, etc.) and
various sources of uncertainties, a major research question that
is unsolved at present is how to represent trust for natural
and artificial uncertainties. Natural uncertainty is about the
outcome of a transaction, whereas artificial uncertainty results
from second-hand experiences (i.e., opinions that are learned
from other entities/sources). As noted above, among others,
the potential adaptations of blockchain for IoT can provide
decentralised, secure and robust access control while replacing
the centralised trusted authority [105] [106] [107]. This will
enable more transparency in IoT access control for both users
and devices based on a level of collaboration, efficiency and
improved visibility of trust among the entities.
C. Standardisation
The characteristics of IoT make it challenging to address
interoperability and standardisation within the systems, ap-
plications, and various services [108]. In the IoT, there are
many issues related to a diverse number of protocols as
well as the lack of agreement on which ones work best for
individual layers of an IoT architecture. Significantly, most
of the Internet standards are designed for general purpose
devices and do not account for the specific requirement of
IoT . We observe that many of the access control models
can fit in one integrated system but are unsuitable for others.
Given the nature (e.g., resource-constrained, dynamic, highly
scalable) of an IoT system, these access control requirements
are varied, and enforcing a proper standardisation is extremely
difficult for the IoT. This includes the potential disruption of
the international communication lines, dynamically utilizing
locally available IoT resources, and constant adaptation of
new services and applications [109]. As such, a furture re-
search issue is how to coordinate with different blockchain
technologies, applications, and services to maintain seamless
interoperability for the IoT systems in a standardised way.
While various organisations, e.g., the IEEE and the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), are actively working on
IoT standardisation, as of now, there is no standard plat-
form for IoT aggregation whether it comes to applications
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TABLE V: Major advantages and disadvantages of different access control mechanisms used for the IoT systems
AC Mechanisms Advantages Disadvantages
RBAC Provides stronger security by enforcing effec-
tive policy management.
Policy management and their informants are
highly centralised. It typically requires explicit
user assignment to specific roles and supports
only pre-defined and static policies which do
not support the scale of an IoT system.
ABAC Provides flexibility as the access control deci-
sion is performed based on attributes. It helps
to enforce fine-grained access control policies
in real-time.
In an IoT context, the use of ABAC raises
important questions of the number of policy
requirements, the policy evaluations, storage of
attribute policy base, and the associated cost of
applications.
CapBAC Considers the resource-constrained characteris-
tics of the IoT devices simplifies the distribution
of permissions, and allows fine-grained access
control. It is decentralised by nature.
Management of the number of capabilities that
are required in a realistic IoT system and the
issues of capability propagation and revocation
are two common challenges when employing it
for IoT systems.
Blockchain Provides high security to prevent unauthorised
data access. It is a distributed database of veri-
fiable records.
Scalability remains an open issue for blockchain
management. For instance, blockchain ledgers
can expand large over time that raises the issue
to download and store the ledger.
and services [110]. Today, many IoT devices are deployed
with proprietary protocols which further makes it difficult
to communicate among multiple IoT devices using a single
blockchain platform [111].
D. Identity Management
We argue that the scope and nature of an IoT system mean
that insisting on a definitive, unique, identity in every case is
overly restrictive. While in some circumstances such unique
identification will be required, in other cases less defined
identities will suffice for the needs of application function-
ality and policy specification. It is challenging to analyze,
appraise and classify the various representations of identities
in a detailed and comprehensive manner, and examine their
suitability within the context of an IoT system [112]. The
vision of IoT implies that knowing the identities of individual
entities before an interaction is, in many cases, impractical.
To this end, future research should address how to design a
flexible identity management framework for IoT access control
at scale supported by blockchain technology [113].
There are several proposed identity management frame-
works; however, they have not been demonstrated to ade-
quately address the particular nature of the IoT, including
its scale and heterogeneous context [114]. Blockchain can
enable a robust network meshes in which IoT devices can
communicate securely without the need for revealing each
other’s identities. This can be achieved by employing efficient
consensus mechanisms. We note that ABAC can be an alterna-
tive for managing IoT identity, where users are identified by
sets of attributes e.g., name, age, location, etc [115] [116].
Significantly, in ABAC, access control permissions are as-
signed based on the policies that are governed by the attributes.
These attributes can be seen as the properties that describe
specific features of users, resources, contexts, and conditions.
The attributes of the user and those of the resource together
determine the set of operations (based on the policies) that
can be performed in a specific context. The use of attributes
can provide a powerful method of specifying access policies
in a flexible and fine-grained way that is particularly useful
in an IoT system. Proposal [117] further demonstrates how
using attributes, we can flexibly define IoT identity, which
in turn specifies the available permissions. This reduces the
number of policies that must be created by allowing a single
attribute expression to provide access to multiple resources.
Note that the same attributes may have different values in
different contexts. For instance, let us consider the attribute
‘qualified’ which may exist in two contexts e.g. ‘a taxi driver’
and ‘a plane pilot’. In other words, in this case, the attribute
‘qualified’ may have the value ‘true’ in the context of a taxi
driver but ‘not true’ in the case of a plane pilot. There are
also possibilities to create smart contracts to enable controlled
data disclosure which in turn help in IoT identity management
providing ‘trusted’ auditability required for IoT access control
systems [118] [119] [120].
E. Road Ahead
We observed that there is a need for protecting IoT sys-
tems from unauthorised users, services, and applications by
enforcing appropriate access control mechanisms that satisfy
the various characteristics and requirements of an IoT system.
This could not be fixed with the use of simple software patches
or applying heavy-weight security mechanisms inside the re-
source constrained IoT devices, rather it requires the dedicated
access control architecture, light-weight security mechanisms,
secure communication protocols and appropriate policy man-
agement [121]. Moreover, the scope and variety of recent
technological developments impose sophisticated constraints
e.g., find-grained security attributes, for authentication and
authorisation in IoT systems that are not supported by earlier
security frameworks. Entities in IoT still need some basis
on which to determine whether to interact with one another,
including the bestowal and acknowledgement of access control
rights. Consider the context of the size and scale in an IoT
system, the access control mechanisms must be asynchronous.
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Using blockchain access control policies are encrypted and
securely stored inside the blocks that gives more flexibility in
accessing these policies when required. That said, it should
not be assumed that entities in an IoT system are constantly
in communication with each or the wider system [122]. The
use of blockchain also reduces the dependencies over a single
central manager. A single control point would run the risks
of single point of failure, amongst others. We also noted
that there is a need to minimize the overhead created by
many security mechanisms for the IoT. These mechanisms
can be enforced in various ways in access control and policy
management e.g., in back-end management, secure design, and
development practices, or even at an application level. Recall,
access control in IoT is application-specific and it requires
dedicated infrastructures and contexts within which it will
function [123].
We noted, among others, that building trust between various
entities in a highly dynamic and scalable system like the IoT
is a challenging task that is significant when sharing informa-
tion and controlling their access. Most of the access control
approaches at present enhance the traditional distributed trust
management systems for the IoT, lacking the proper need
for trust in an IoT context [124]. We argue that there is a
need to investigate the fusion of multiple observations along
with the distributed aspects of trust in decision making under
multiple-sources for large-scale IoT systems. We note that
comprehensive research in IoT trust is required which must
consider a complete view of an IoT system, along with its
access control needs and design requirements supported by
blockchain technology.
Moreover, the convergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
in blockchain technology is promising and can be combined
in multiple dimensions to build a sustainable access control
mechanism for IoT systems [125]. With the help of Machine
Learning (ML) algorithms, AI can improve access control pro-
cesses by detecting access patterns and optimize the network’s
maintenance with little or no human interference. However, a
broad spectrum of adaptation and integration of blockchain
and AI technologies in IoT bring both opportunities and
challenges in terms of scalability, security, identity, interoper-
ability, and trust management. For blockchain transformation
in AI need to provide accuracy and certainty to devise con-
sensus protocols for mining nodes in developing successful
cognitive systems. Some of the challenges for ML adaptation
in blockchain in IoT include the design and development of
smart agents with improved learning capability to regulate
blockchain, and the proper consideration of uncertainty, e.g.,
the risks related to a given access control mechanism, that
are present in such highly dynamic IoT systems. An efficient
access control framework must be built to combine ML-
assisted data fusion mechanisms for multi-layer and multi-
vendor blockchain systems for data authorisation in IoT. The
other aspect could be the implementation of ML algorithms
in smart contracts [126]. This requires novel solutions from
both the theoretical and practical sides. There is a need for
methodological, algorithmic, mathematical, and computational
models combining blockchain and AI to solve the theoretical
and practical problems in large-scale IoT systems [127].
V. CONCLUSION
With the rapid development of the IoT, research in the
IoT landscape becomes an important issue and it continues
to grow every day. However, one significant challenge is
the provision of security within the IoT, in particular, the
need for access control is paramount. We have noted that the
traditional access control mechanisms cannot achieve efficient
management of access control policies and enforcement of
authorisation decisions for large-scale IoT systems. That said,
IoT systems require a unique solution for access control.
We observed that the blockchain has the potential to achieve
the several desire goals of IoT access control e.g., tamper-
proof, trusted, decentralised control, data transparency, and
auditability. However, one common issue to the existing access
control surveys in IoT is that they have a lack of focus on the
emerging blockchain technology. In this paper, we reviewed
recent trends of such blockchain-based access control solutions
for the IoT systems. We provided a systematic discussion of
the existing blockchain-based access control solutions for the
IoT by categorizing them based on the certain access control
needs they satisfy e.g., resource management, access rights
transfer, permission enforcement, attribute management, and
scalability. We have shown how blockchain can improve the
limitations of IoT access control issues over the traditional
access control mechanisms addressing these access control
needs. Our review also explored a list of important future re-
search directions in order to address policy management, trust,
identity management, and inclusion of data-driven technology
(e.g., artificial intelligence) to deliver a flexible, decentralised,
trustworthy and fine-grained access control for the IoT sup-
ported by blockchain.
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[52] M. Conoscenti, A. Vetrò, and J. C. D. Martin, “Blockchain for the
internet of things: A systematic literature review,” in 2016 IEEE/ACS
13th International Conference of Computer Systems and Applications
(AICCSA), Nov 2016, pp. 1–6.
[53] “Bosch connected devices and solutions,” 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://xdk.bosch-connectivity.com/
[54] “Hyundai digital asset company,” 2019. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.hdactech.com/en/index.do
[55] T. M. Fernández-Caramés and P. Fraga-Lamas, “A review on the use of
blockchain for the internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 32 979–
33 001, 2018.
[56] M. A. Khan and K. Salah, “Iot security: Review, blockchain
solutions, and open challenges,” Future Generation Computer
Systems, vol. 82, pp. 395 – 411, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167739X17315765
[57] F. Restuccia, S. D’Oro, S. S. Kanhere, T. Melodia, and S. K. Das,
“Blockchain for the internet of things: Present and future,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1903.07448, 2019. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1903.
07448
[58] A. Panarello, N. Tapas, G. Merlino, F. Longo, and A. Puliafito,
“Blockchain and iot integration: A systematic survey,” Sensors,
vol. 18, no. 8, 2018. [Online]. Available: http://www.mdpi.com/
1424-8220/18/8/2575
[59] A. Reyna, C. Martı́n, J. Chen, E. Soler, and M. Dı́az, “On blockchain
and its integration with iot. challenges and opportunities,” Future
Generation Computer Systems, vol. 88, pp. 173 – 190, 2018.
[Online]. Available: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/
S0167739X17329205
[60] M. S. Ali, M. Vecchio, M. Pincheira, K. Dolui, F. Antonelli, and M. H.
Rehmani, “Applications of blockchains in the internet of things: A
comprehensive survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, pp.
1–1, 2018.
[61] V. Dedeoglu, R. Jurdak, A. Dorri, R. Lunardi, R. Michelin, A. Zorzo,
and S. Kanhere, “Blockchain technologies for iot,” in Advanced Appli-
cations of Blockchain Technology. Springer, 2020, pp. 55–89.
[62] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, “Blockchain
for iot security and privacy: The case study of a smart home,” in
2017 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communications Workshops (PerCom Workshops), 2017, pp. 618–623.
[63] O. Novo, “Blockchain meets iot: An architecture for scalable access
management in iot,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
1184–1195, April 2018.
[64] Y. Zhang, S. Kasahara, Y. Shen, X. Jiang, and J. Wan, “Smart contract-
based access control for the internet of things,” IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, pp. 1–1, 2019.
[65] M. Nuss, A. Puchta, and M. Kunz, “Towards blockchain-based identity
and access management for internet of things in enterprises,” in Trust,
Privacy and Security in Digital Business, S. Furnell, H. Mouratidis,
and G. Pernul, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018,
pp. 167–181.
[66] R. Xu, Y. Chen, E. Blasch, and G. Chen, “Blendcac: A
blockchain-enabled decentralized capability-based access control
for iots,” CoRR, vol. abs/1804.09267, 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.09267
[67] T. Le and M. W. Mutka, “Capchain: A privacy preserving access control
framework based on blockchain for pervasive environments,” in 2018
IEEE International Conference on Smart Computing (SMARTCOMP),
June 2018, pp. 57–64.
[68] S. Pal, T. Rabehaja, M. Hitchens, V. Varadharajan, and A. Hill, “On the
design of a flexible delegation model for the internet of things using
blockchain,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 16,
no. 5, pp. 3521–3530, 2020.
[69] S. Pal, T. Rabehaja, A. Hill, M. Hitchens, and V. Varadharajan, “On the
integration of blockchain to the internet of things for enabling access
right delegation,” IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 7, no. 4, pp.
2630–2639, 2020.
[70] G. Ali, N. Ahmad, Y. Cao, M. Asif, H. Cruickshank, and Q. E. Ali,
“Blockchain based permission delegation and access control in internet
of things (baci),” Computers & Security, 2019. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404819301208
[71] H. Shafagh, L. Burkhalter, A. Hithnawi, and S. Duquennoy, “Towards
blockchain-based auditable storage and sharing of iot data,” in
Proceedings of the 2017 on Cloud Computing Security Workshop, ser.
CCSW ’17. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017, pp. 45–50. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3140649.3140656
[72] S. Algarni, F. Eassa, K. Almarhabi, A. Almalaise, E. Albassam,
K. Alsubhi, and M. Yamin, “Blockchain-based secured access control
in an iot system,” Applied Sciences, vol. 11, no. 4, p. 1772, 2021.
[73] A. Dorri, S. S. Kanhere, R. Jurdak, and P. Gauravaram, “Lsb:
A lightweight scalable blockchain for iot security and anonymity,”
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, vol. 134, pp. 180–
197, 2019. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0743731518307688
[74] H. Liu, D. Han, and D. Li, “Fabric-iot: A blockchain-based access
control system in iot,” IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 18 207–18 218, 2020.
[75] S. Sun, R. Du, S. Chen, and W. Li, “Blockchain-based iot access
control system: Towards security, lightweight, and cross-domain,” IEEE
Access, vol. 9, pp. 36 868–36 878, 2021.
[76] Y. Zhang, B. Li, B. Liu, J. Wu, Y. Wang, and X. Yang, “An
attribute-based collaborative access control scheme using blockchain
for iot devices,” Electronics, vol. 9, no. 2, 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://www.mdpi.com/2079-9292/9/2/285
[77] R. Almadhoun, M. Kadadha, M. Alhemeiri, M. Alshehhi, and K. Salah,
“A user authentication scheme of iot devices using blockchain-enabled
fog nodes,” in 2018 IEEE-ACS 15th International Conference on
Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–8.
[78] M. Farhadi, D. Miorandi, and G. Pierre, “Blockchain enabled fog
structure to provide data security in iot applications,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1901.04830, 2019. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.
04830
[79] I. Riabi, L. A. Saidane, and H. K. Ayed, “A proposal of a distributed
access control over fog computing: The its use case,” in 2017 Interna-
tional Conference on Performance Evaluation and Modeling in Wired
and Wireless Networks (PEMWN), Nov 2017, pp. 1–7.
[80] S. Hameed, F. I. Khan, and B. Hameed, “Understanding security
requirements and challenges in internet of things (iot): A review,”
Journal of Computer Networks and Communications, vol. 2019, 2019.
[81] D. Unal, M. Hammoudeh, and M. S. Kiraz, “Policy specification and
verification for blockchain and smart contracts in 5g networks,” ICT
Express, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 43–47, 2020.
[82] A. W. Kiwelekar, P. Patil, L. D. Netak, and S. U. Waikar,
Blockchain-Based Security Services for Fog Computing. Cham:
Springer International Publishing, 2021, pp. 271–290. [Online].
Available: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57328-7 11
[83] M. Mukherjee, L. Shu, and D. Wang, “Survey of fog computing:
Fundamental, network applications, and research challenges,” IEEE
Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 1826–1857,
thirdquarter 2018.
[84] C. Puliafito, E. Mingozzi, F. Longo, A. Puliafito, and O. Rana,
“Fog computing for the internet of things: A survey,” ACM Trans.
Internet Technol., vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 18:1–18:41, Apr. 2019. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3301443
[85] A. A. Baktyan and A. T. Zahary, “A review on cloud and fog computing
integration for iot: Platforms perspective,” EAI Endorsed Transactions
on Internet of Things, vol. 4, no. 14, 12 2018.
[86] M. Yannuzzi, R. Milito, R. Serral-Gracià, D. Montero, and M. Ne-
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